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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a unique resolution to the debate over political campaign
participation by tax-exempt organizations, specifically religious organizations. By
virtue of their tax-exempt status, these organizations are banned from participating
in political campaign activity. Commentators have debated the merits of this ban for
years and to say that commentators have been all over the map regarding their opin-
ions over the ban is putting it charitably. The ban’s advocates and opponents have
staked out seemingly every position imaginable in arguing the merits of this ban.
Some commentators have argued forcefully that the ban is needed to preserve consti-
tutional separation of church and state. Other commentators have argued as passion-
ately that the ban is unconstitutional and pulls at the fabric of American democracy
by unduly limiting political participation by churches and religious organizations.
The arguments of each side of the debate take a zero-sum gain approach to resolving
the debate, and commentators seem to discount the concerns of the opposition as
either irrelevant or insignificant.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the debate in the literature over the
ban’s legitimacy. Rather, this Article proposes a solution that the literature has
apparently ignored: finding a compromise between the two extremes of the debate
that addresses the primary concerns of both sides. This Article proposes that section
501(c)(3) organizations be permitted an increased amount of political campaign
activity in exchange for paying a tax referred to as a “self-directed tax.” What makes
the self-directed tax unique is that the organizations themselves would be permitted
to direct the government as to how to allocate the proceeds from the tax to a preset
group of government spending choices. Similar rules would apply to the charitable
deduction as well. The self-directed tax would allow section 501(c)(3) organizations
to become more politically active. This Article’s proposal, however, still allows sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations to preserve their unique status as partners with govern-
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ment in the provision of public goods—a status that justifies not requiring them to
provide a portion of their profits to the government for the government to do with as
it pleases.
“People talk about the middle of the road as though it were unacceptable. Actually,
all human problems, excepting morals, come into the gray areas. Things are not all
black and white. There have to be compromises. The middle of the road is all of the
usable surface. The extremes, right and left, are in the gutters.”
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 1963
INTRODUCTION
Few provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) have caused as much
angst as section 501(c)(3).1 This section establishes the tax-exempt status2 for
many charitable organizations. To gain tax-exempt status, the IRC requires
these organizations to refrain from providing any private inurement to a share-
holder or individual, to engage only in insubstantial lobbying activities, and to
completely refrain from being involved in political campaign activity.3 This
last requirement, the complete ban on political campaign activity, has generated
an enormous amount of ink from commentators.4
1 Section 501(c)(3) states that tax exempt status will be granted to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or
to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)),
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
2 In conjunction with 26 U.S.C. § 170, it also establishes the eligibility for tax-deductible
donations to these organizations. Id.
3 In pertinent part, this condition states that:
[N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempt-
ing, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any politi-
cal campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
4 For those interested in the topic, the most thorough overview of the arguments surrounding
the ban have been complied and discussed in NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLIT-
ICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS (2011). David M.
Andersen opines that:
The bulk of modern attention in this area has centered on the political campaign ban while
giving only lip service to the restriction against ‘substantial’ attempts to influence legislation.
This one-sided focus of commentators and legislators likely stems from not only the increased
political activity of churches during recent presidential elections but also the relative harshness
of the political campaign ban versus the lobbying restrictions.
David M. Andersen, Comment, Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of Removing
Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts to Influence Legislation, 2006 BYU L. REV.
115, 117–18 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
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Much of the handwringing over this ban has centered on its effect on
churches and religious organizations, which are usually organized under section
501(c)(3). In a debate lasting years, the ban’s proponents and opponents have
staked out seemingly every position imaginable in arguing the validity and
merits of the ban. Proponents have forcefully argued that the ban is valid and
needed to preserve constitutional separation of church and state.5 Opponents
have argued just as forcefully that the ban is invalid and pulls at the fabric of
American democracy by unduly limiting the political participation of churches
and religious organizations.6
This Article does not attempt to resolve the debate over the ban’s validity.
Instead, it recognizes the incentive for both sides of the debate to seek an
acceptable compromise. The ban’s proponents should seek an acceptable com-
promise because if the ban were ever held to be invalid the ban’s proponents
would be largely left without a mechanism through which they could address
their concerns. The ban’s opponents, however, should seek an acceptable com-
promise because if the ban continues to be held valid7 the debate over the ban’s
merits on policy grounds has the potential to rage on indefinitely. Unfortu-
nately, as Benjamin Leff has observed, the compromise proposals thus far have
somewhat of a “ships passing in the night” feel to them.8 Each side of the
debate seems to gloss over the concerns of the opposition, discounting those
concerns as either irrelevant or insignificant.9
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to propose a compromise that
realistically addresses the concerns of all sides. This Article crafts a proposal
through which section 501(c)(3) organizations can become more politically
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part II.
7 At least for the foreseeable future, the ban’s survival appears to be the more likely out-
come, if for no other reason than the government appears reluctant to litigate current theories
regarding the ban’s invalidity, which denies opponents a forum to raise new arguments chal-
lenging existing law upholding the ban’s validity. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,
211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the ban’s validity); Kevin Dolak, ‘Pulpit Freedom
Sunday’ to Defy IRS, ABC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/defiant-pas-
tors-irs-pulpit-freedom-sunday/story?id=11726610 (observing that, despite direct and inten-
tional violations of the ban during the Alliance Defense Fund’s Pulpit Freedom Sundays, the
IRS has not been aggressive about investigating many of the participating pastors, which
stymies these pastors’ efforts to mount their challenges to the ban’s validity in court); see
also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by
Charities, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) [hereinafter Mayer, Grasping Smoke]
(observing that “[b]y most accounts, IRS enforcement of the prohibition has been spotty at
best”); Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to Enforce
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the
IRS’s weak enforcement track record is because the penalty is too severe).
8 Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally
Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 679 (2009); see
also Brunson, supra note 7 (summarizing the arguments both for and against the prohibition
and concluding that both sides in the argument are flawed and rebuttable).
9 More recent commentators, however, have started to appreciate that they must account for
the concerns of the opposition in crafting proposals that would be acceptable to all sides.
CRIMM & WINER, supra note 4, at 326 (“[W]e are merely trying to be realists working within
established constitutional principles to ameliorate significant and provocative First Amend-
ment tensions while posing little actual danger to any abiding constitutional values.”).
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active without having such activity subsidized through a tax exemption. This
Article’s proposal, however, still allows section 501(c)(3) organizations to pre-
serve their unique status as partners with the government in the provision of
public goods—a status that justifies the tax exemption. Although the proposal
would apply to all section 501(c)(3) organizations, the proposal’s benefits will
be discussed primarily in regards to churches and religious organizations, as
issues surrounding these organizations have generated the bulk of the debate
over the ban.
This Article will summarize the arguments of the ban’s proponents in Part
I and the ban’s opponents in Part II. Part III will sketch the parameters of a
compromise proposal—a self-directed tax—and the primary benefits from such
a proposal. Part IV will discuss secondary benefits to the self-directed tax.
Finally, this Article will conclude that the self-directed tax is a viable compro-
mise in this seemingly never-ending debate.
I. ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE BAN ON POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION
The ban’s proponents argue the ban is legally permissible, is good public
and tax policy, and provides sufficient protection for religious organizations.
Proponents argue the ban is legally permissible because it is both constitutional
and is consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
In addition, proponents argue the ban is good public policy because it furthers
separation of church and state, which benefits both society at large and the
religious organizations themselves. Although the public policy arguments are
likely the most compelling policy arguments favoring the ban, proponents also
argue the ban is good tax policy because allowing religious organizations to
engage in some political activities violates the fundamental tax principle of
substantive horizontal equity. Finally, proponents argue the ban provides suffi-
cient protections for religious organizations by allowing political speech
through section 501(c)(4) organizations.
A. The Ban Is Legally Permissible
Any restriction on religious organizations’ speech inevitably raises consti-
tutional concerns regarding violations of freedom of speech and free exercise of
religion.10 Nevertheless, proponents of the ban argue there are no such consti-
tutional violations11 because the restriction neither prevents the exercise of
religion nor violates free speech—it simply prevents the government from sub-
sidizing a religious organization’s political speech.12 Proponents also argue the
10 See infra Part II.A.–B.
11 The most forceful recent arguments come from Donald Tobin. See Donald B. Tobin,
Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous For 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous
for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2007); see also, e.g., Oliver S. Thomas, The
Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments for Church Tax Exemption and
the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 605 (1992) (summarizing the jurispru-
dence that makes asserting constitutional challenges to the ban difficult).
12 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1346 (discussing the free speech issues and pointing out that
the ban was not meant to punish or control political speech but was rather simply meant to
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ban is consistent with the free exercise of religion under Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.13 In Smith, the Court
held that generally applicable and neutral laws do not violate the free exercise
of religion.14 Proponents argue the ban is a generally applicable and neutral law
because it applies to all tax-exempt organizations and does not single out relig-
ious organizations. The ban does not inhibit religious organizations’ constitu-
tional rights to free speech,15 the argument goes, because they are perfectly free
to engage in political campaign activity16 through the creation of an affiliate
organization under IRC § 501(c)(4) (although the affiliate organization could
not receive tax-exempt donations).17
avoid giving 501(c)(3) organizations an unfair advantage); id. at 1346–47 (discussing the
free exercise concerns and noting also that “a subsidy by the government for the purpose of
encouraging the free exercise of religion would violate the Establishment Clause”).
13 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
14 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1347. Additionally, Nicholas A. Mirkay similarly notes that:
[B]ased on the above case law, provided a tax [(i)] does not constitute a prior restraint on relig-
ious activity, (ii) does not have as its primary purpose to impede such activity, (iii) is applied in a
broad and religiously neutral manner, and (iv) does not impose too high of a rate, neither the
taxation of, nor a restriction on an exemption granted to, religious organizations, should likely
raise any free exercise concerns.
Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3) Exemption of
Religious Organizations That Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 715, 753 (2009);
see also Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibition on Political Cam-
paign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 298 (2007).
15 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1346.
16 See infra, Part I.D.
17 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court rea-
soned that:
As was the case with TWR, the Church may form a related organization under section 501(c)(4)
of the Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (tax exemption for “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not
organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare”). Such organi-
zations are exempt from taxation; but unlike their section 501(c)(3) counterparts, contributions to
them are not deductible. See id. § 170(c); see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 543, 552-53, 103 S.Ct.
1997. Although a section 501(c)(4) organization is also subject to the ban on intervening in
political campaigns, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1999), it may form a political action
committee (“PAC”) that would be free to participate in political campaigns. Id. § 1.527-6(f), (g)
(“[A]n organization described in section 501(c) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(a)
may, [if it is not a section 501(c)(3) organization], establish and maintain such a separate segre-
gated fund to receive contributions and make expenditures in a political campaign.”).
Id.; see also Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain
Shall Meet?, 1 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 35, 82–83 (2003); Stephanie A. Bruch, Comment,
Politicking from the Pulpit: An Analysis of the IRS’s Current Section 501(c)(3) Enforcement
Efforts and How it is Costing America, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1253, 1263 (2009); Chris
Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church
Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 161 (2006) (note that while
Kemmitt is not a staunch supporter of the ban, he acknowledges that the use of political
action committees by § 501(c)(4) affiliates has provided a mechanism through which relig-
ious organizations could continue to be involved in the political process in spite of the ban);
Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324–26. Further, see infra Part I.D. for a more detailed discussion
of why proponents believe that these 501(c)(4) organizations justify the ban on political
campaigning on policy grounds.
Note, however, that in the wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), commentators disagree whether the ban remains legally permissible
because of the Court’s rejection of the arguments that PACs provide an acceptable alterna-
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Proponents also argue that the ban is consistent with the RFRA, which
Congress enacted to overrule a part of Smith’s holding. The RFRA requires the
government to establish that any law that infringes the free exercise of religion
is the least restrictive mechanism of furthering a compelling government inter-
est.18 Donald Tobin has argued, however, that the RFRA will only apply if the
ban substantially burdens religion, which, he contends, the ban does not.19 Spe-
cifically, Tobin argues the ban does not burden religion; the ban simply pre-
vents religious organizations from receiving a subsidy without preventing them
from accomplishing their fundamental religious missions, which they can
achieve through permissible issue advocacy.20 Furthermore, commentators
have observed that even if a compelling interest standard were appropriate,
generally applicable tax laws are justifiable under such a standard.21
Although the ban’s supporters believe it is lawful, they must also establish
it is good policy. Accordingly, proponents have argued that the ban is a good
idea based on both general public policy and specific tax policy ground.
B. The Ban Is Good Public Policy
In addition to being legally permissible, proponents of the ban argue it is
good public policy because it benefits both society at large and the religious
organizations themselves. The ban benefits society by preventing religious
organizations from becoming too powerful.22 Without the ban, religious orga-
nizations could overly influence candidates who are eager to use them as vehi-
cles for tax-deductible campaign contributions.23 Such increasing power and
influence “poses serious problems for our current system of governance.”24
tive forum for speech in the corporate context. Compare Roger Colinvaux, Citizens United
and the Political Speech of Charities (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1726407 (discussing why the ban would
still not be an impermissible restriction on free speech even in the wake of Citizens United)
with, Paul Weitzel, Protecting Speech from the Heart: Political Speech by 501(c)(3) Chari-
table Organizations After Citizens United, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848267&http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848267 (arguing that the ban is no longer legally permis-
sible after Citizens United).
18 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1347; Totten, supra note 4, at 318–19.
19 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1347–48.
20 Id. at 1347–48, 1353–54. Tobin acknowledges “that it is possible that a religion might be
able to argue that endorsement of a candidate is central to its religious beliefs. In such a case,
the court would have to determine . . . whether the political campaign ban violates the statu-
tory test in RFRA.” Id. at 1348.
21 Id. (“In examining tax cases pre- and post-Smith, tax statutes of general applicability
have been upheld even under a compelling interest-type standard.”); Totten, supra note 14,
at 318–19. Totten goes on to state that “[n]onetheless, the Court’s past insistence that the
government has a compelling interest in the uniform application of tax laws leaves little hope
that courts would grant an exemption.” Id.
22 Tobin, supra note 11, at 1317–18.
23 See id. at 1318; see also, Sarah Hawkins, Note, From Branch Ministries to Selma: Why
the Internal Revenue Service Should Strictly Enforce the § 501(c)(3) Prohibition Against
Church Electioneering, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 203 (2008).
24 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1326; see also Bruce Chapman, Between Markets and Polit-
ics: A Social Choice Theoretic Appreciation of the Charitable Sector, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 821, 838–39 (1998). In addition, the ban can help ameliorate some of the democratic
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Furthermore, proponents argue the ban is good public policy because it
benefits religious organizations by allowing them to preserve their indepen-
dence from undue government influence.25 Religious organizations inevitably
lose some of their ability to preach their doctrine accurately if they are con-
cerned about offending a political candidate who is channeling significant
donations towards the organizations.26 This concern over not wanting to disap-
point political candidates could cause candidates to pressure religious organiza-
tions to participate actively in campaigns.27 While some religious organizations
might see their fortunes improve from gaining favor with politicians, others
would suffer if they did not participate in politics at a high level because they
would be relegated to a secondary status in their relationship to the government
when compared to the “preferred” (participating) organizations.28 The quest to
become a “preferred” organization could have a corrupting and divisive effect
on the organizations, as individuals within the organization find opportunities
to profit from their power and as members bring their political opinions into the
distortions inherent in the “majority voting paradox,” in which, because of inherent differ-
ences in individual preferences among multiple alternatives, “a majority of voters . . . can
only choose a minority preferred alternative.” Id. The charitable sector solves this paradox
by allowing individuals to support various public goods through a tax subsidy for their chari-
table contributions. If charities, however, participated in political campaign activity, the
inherent conflicts among individual preferences in the “majority voting paradox” would be
exacerbated, which could increase the possibility of a paradox occurring. Chapman explains
the “majority voting paradox” as the following:
To see this problem at work, suppose that there is a committee of three individuals considering
three alternatives for choice according to the method of majority rule. Imagine that each individ-
ual ranks the three alternatives x, y, and z (in order of preference) as follows:
Individual A: x y z
Individual B: y z x
Individual C: z x y
It is easy to see that a majority of individuals (A and C) prefer x to y, a majority (B and C)
prefers z to x, and a majority (A and B) prefers y to z. Thus, it is not possible to choose any of x,
y, or z as the majority preferred choice without some other alternative being preferred by a
majority as well. That a majority of voters in this situation can only choose a minority preferred
alternative is the reason that this is sometimes referred to as the ‘majority voting paradox.’
Majority voting must continue to cycle endlessly (and wastefully) among the alternatives or,
somewhat arbitrarily (it is said) stop at one alternative, recognizing that, while this is some kind
of end to the matter, it is no more a majority preferred choice than any other. Such a ‘resolution’
of the issue is likely to be very unstable politically.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1322 (noting that “[c]hurches have flourished in the United
States partially because religion and government have occupied independent spheres.”)
(footnote omitted).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1323–24.
28 Id.
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pews.29 Additionally, removing the ban potentially divides religious communi-
ties by alienating certain political persuasions from certain communities.30
C. The Ban Is Good Tax Policy
Outside of these public policy arguments, proponents argue the ban is
good tax policy. Richard J. Wood argues that allowing a limited exception to
the ban “violates the [fundamental tax] principle of substantive horizontal
equity because taxpayers of equal income consumption or wealth [would be]
treated differently without principled tax policy reasons for the distinction.”31
This violation of horizontal equity would occur on two fronts: (1) political
speakers funded by religious organizations would receive more funds than
those funded by other organizations, even if the contributors had identical
incomes and consumption;32 and (2) political contributions to churches from
high-income taxpayers would receive a preference over contributions from
low-income taxpayers.33 In addition, Wood argues that “[s]ystemic horizontal
equity would be violated . . . because it would create an undefined exception to
enforcement of 501(c)(3) that would diminish the ability of the Service to
enforce the law.”34
29 Id. at 1324–25. Even opponents of the ban admit that removing the ban creates a risk of
charities being used to advance private interests, an issue that must be addressed. See, e.g.,
Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by
Charities through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071 (2007) [hereinafter Buckles,
Not Even a Peep]. This problem could be potentially exacerbated by the relative lack of
regulatory oversight over religious organizations, which have very few reporting require-
ments connected to their tax-exempt status. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1341–42. Tobin argues
that this lack of information reporting also makes it “almost impossible for private parties to
provide any type of check on a church’s activities.” Id. at 1342.
30 Hawkins argues that:
[Removing the ban] would foster divisiveness within the religious community by discouraging
parishioners of one political persuasion from attending services at, or contributing to, churches
that support only political ideas adverse to theirs . . . [and that removing the ban] would also
foster divisiveness outside the religious community by polarizing different congregations based
on perceived political persuasion.
Hawkins, supra note 23, at 203 (footnote omitted).
31 Richard J. Wood, Pious Politics: Political Speech Funded Through I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
Organizations Examined Under Tax Fairness Principles, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 209, 215 (2007)
(footnote omitted) (addressing an attempt to provide such an exception through the Houses
of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act).
32 This is because the value of the deductibility of a contribution to a religious organization
engaged in political speech allows a taxpayer to contribute fewer dollars to fund the same
amount of political speech as a taxpayer making a non-deductible contribution to a political
organization. Id. at 216–17 (providing an illustration with two hypothetical taxpayers).
33 Again, this disparate treatment arises out of the value of the deduction, which is more
economically valuable to taxpayers who are in a higher tax bracket. Id. at 219–20 (providing
an illustration using hypothetical taxpayers).
34 Id. at 215.
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D. The Ban Provides Sufficient Protection for Religious Organizations By
Allowing Political Speech Through the Use of Section 501(c)(4)
Organizations
Further supporting the constitutional and policy arguments favoring the
ban is the fact that, even if there are legitimate constitutional or policy concerns
with restricting religious organizations’ political speech, the ban adequately
mitigates any concerns that religious organizations might have. As the D.C.
Circuit noted in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,35 religious organizations are cur-
rently permitted to engage in political speech—they simply must create a sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organization36 that is maintained separately from the section
501(c)(3) religious organization.37
Tobin argues that the availability of section 501(c)(4) organizations effec-
tively balances the rights of religious organizations to engage in the political
process with appropriate separation between church and state.38 Tobin further
argues that requiring religious organizations to use section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions as the vehicle for their political involvement does not simply create a
“distinction without a difference.”39 Rather, this formalistic solution furthers
the separation of church and state by forcing independent assets (not tax
deductible to the donor) to fund political activity, which places religious orga-
nizations on the same playing field as other organizations participating in the
political process.40 In addition, section 501(c)(4) organizations help insulate
religious organizations from political pressure because those that choose not to
create section 501(c)(4) organizations would thus indicate their lack of desire to
engage in political activity.41 Finally, section 501(c)(4) organizations help sep-
arate “the theological and the political . . . [because t]he 501(c)(4) organization
cannot preach during services, and it cannot use the power of the pulpit to tell
people how to vote.”42
In short, the option of section 501(c)(4) adequately balances the interests
of religious organizations with the constitutional and policy concerns. Of
35 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
36 Unlike a § 501(c)(3) organization, a § 501(c)(4) organization can create a political action
committee. Id.; see also Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324–26; Murphy, supra note 17; Kem-
mitt, supra note 17; Bruch, supra note 17.
37 See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324–26. Even opponents of the ban note that maintaining
the requisite separation between the entities to avoid the loss of tax-exempt status of the
section 501(c)(3) organization is a relatively straightforward matter. Chris Kemmitt notes
that, “[g]enerally, as long as the organizations are separately incorporated and keep records
sufficient to prove that tax-deductible contributions to the § 501(c)(3) organization are not
being used to pay for the activities of the other organizations, the IRS will not attribute the
acts of one organization to the other.” Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 161. But see Bruch, supra
note 17, at 1263 (“The main barrier for a church forming a § 501(c)(4) organization is the
difficulty of separating political messages from religious messages and tracking the funding
for each activity.”).
38 Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324–26.
39 Id. at 1325 (stating “although it may seem like a distinction without a difference, the fact
that it is the 501(c)(4) organization and not the church itself that is engaging in this activity
at least separates, to a degree, the theological and the political.”).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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course others strongly disagree that this current arrangement adequately allows
religious organizations to inject their voices into the political arena.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BAN ON POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION
The ban’s opponents have tackled the constitutional issues on two fronts.
First, they argue that the Constitution does not require the ban to protect funda-
mental constitutional rights. Second, they take their argument a step further by
contending that, not only does the Constitution not require the ban, but enacting
the ban would be unconstitutional.
A. The Ban Is Not Constitutionally Required
Responding to the criticism that the ban is necessary to prevent the subsi-
dization of political or religious speech, opponents rely on Walz v. Tax Com-
mission of the City of New York,43 in which the Supreme Court held that a tax
exemption along with a tax deduction did not necessarily amount to a govern-
ment subsidy.44 According to Johnny Rex Buckles, those who view preferential
tax treatment of religious organizations as a subsidy improperly consider relig-
ious organizations to be proper subjects of taxation.45 Because religious organi-
zations are better viewed as “limited co-sovereigns with the state,” Buckles
believes that exempting religious organizations from taxation and permitting a
charitable deduction is not a subsidy—it is simply the government appropri-
ately determining the tax base by excluding “community income.”46
43 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
44 See, e.g., Totten, supra note 14, at 308; Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional
Norm of Separation of Church and State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches
that Engage in Partisan Political Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447, 455–63 (2009) [hereinafter
Buckles, Separation of Church and State]; Jennifer M. Smith, Morse Code, Da Vinci Code,
Tax Code and . . . Churches: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis of Why Section
501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 23 J.L. & POL. 41, 76–77 (2007). Johnny Rex Buck-
les has attempted to justify the Walz view against equating favorable tax treatment with a
government subsidy by establishing that this view is logical because it properly excludes
religious organizations from the tax base. Buckles, Separation of Church and State, supra
note 44, at 460–62. Buckles acknowledges that if religious organizations are properly part of
the tax base, and if tax preferences for these organizations are considered to be a government
subsidy, “the separation norm [would counsel] against government aid to churches, at least
when they can use granted funds for whatever religious projects they may select.” Id. at 462.
Note, however, that if one accepts the subsidy argument, the claim that the ban prevents
subsidization of religious organizations’ religious practice “ignores the fact that even with
the prohibition on political activity, the government is providing a ‘subsidy’ to churches to
engage in the free exercise of religion, albeit absent political activity.” Keith S. Blair, Pray-
ing for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax
Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 426 (2009).
45 Buckles, Separation of Church and State, supra note 44; see also John F. Coverdale, The
Normative Justification for Tax Exemption: Elements from Catholic Social Thought, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 889, 892 (2010) (putting forth a rationale for why tax exempt organiza-
tions are properly excludable from the tax base). Coverdale’s argument will be discussed in
greater detail in Part IV.A.
46 Buckles, Separation of Church and State, supra note 44, at 465 (expanding on Evelyn
Brody’s “sovereign” theory of charities as being historically viewed as “limited co-sover-
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Thus, under this view, the ban would not be constitutionally required to
prevent the subsidization of religious speech because the government cannot be
subsidizing something through favorable tax treatment if the object of the fore-
gone tax was not properly subject to the tax in the first place.47
eigns” with the state). Buckles, drawing on both the work of Professors Evelyn Brody and
Edward Zelinsky, argues that this argument has particular resonance with religious organiza-
tions specifically (as opposed to charitable organizations generally) because the government
has historically recognized that, for church and state to be truly separate, government must
fully recognize the complete autonomy of religious organizations by leaving them out of the
tax base. Id. at 460–61; see also Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualiz-
ing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax
“Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular
Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805 (2001).
Kenneth Halcom has also argued that religious organizations cannot be subject to taxa-
tion, although he rests his argument on more traditional constitutional grounds. See generally
Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 729 (2007). Halcom believes that
an income tax imposed on religious organizations would result in “excessive entanglement,”
rendering such a tax unconstitutional under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Id. at
773 (arguing that the tax exemption provided in section 501(c)(3) is superfluous because
such a tax would be unconstitutional, although the statute permissibly can impose conditions
under which the tax exemption for donations could be taken away); see also Buckles, Sepa-
ration of Church and State, supra note 44, at 473 (“The ban requires odious entanglement
between church and state. . . . Policing these messages and invitations to speak never ends,
and it theoretically requires the agency to scrutinize every word of a sermon and to monitor
every guest in a pulpit.”); Blair, supra note 44, at 427 (“The IRS must necessarily monitor
church services and communications to ensure that their content does not cross the line into
political advocacy. . . . This examination of churches runs dangerously close to an entangle-
ment between the government and churches that violates the Free Exercise Clause.”) (foot-
notes omitted); Alan L. Feld, Rendering unto Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of
Church Tax Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931 (2001)
(arguing that the ban’s broad scope could be restricted to avoid any constitutional entangle-
ment issues).
47 The argument that churches are exempt from the tax base is understandably controversial.
See Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C.
L. Rev. 843, 870–71 (2001) (arguing that charitable donations “are discretionary and there-
fore properly part of an income tax base,” as evidenced by their high elasticity) (footnote
omitted). Note, however, that such high elasticity might be caused by more than mere indi-
vidual discretionary preferences—they could be the result of a community-oriented reciproc-
ity among taxpayers that might lend further support to Buckles’s community income theory.
See Chapman, supra note 24 (describing how the high negative elasticity can be explained
by taxpayers following a reciprocity norm and increasing their giving when they see the cost
of giving decrease, which thus makes it more likely that others will give as well).
Accounting for the fact that his argument against including religious organizations in
the tax base might not be successful, Buckles bolsters his argument against subsidization
fears by pointing out that, even if one accepts that the favorable tax treatment of religious
organizations constitutes a subsidy, removing the ban as applied to religious organizations
does not amount to the government subsidization of religions seeking to establish their par-
ticular faiths through support of sympathetic candidates. Buckles, Separation of Church and
State, supra note 44. Because religious organizations would be unlikely to leverage political
support to achieve a disproportionate influence on public policy, any leverage obtained by
one particular religion would be offset by equivalent clout from other religious organizations
as well as non-sectarian institutions. Id. Furthermore, religious organizations would not
receive much in the way of subsidized funds in comparison with other charities because,
even in the absence of the charitable tax exemption, religious organizations receive most of
their operating funds in the form of tax-free gifts that are not deductible to the donors
because they are less likely to itemize their deductions. Id. at 464.
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B. The Ban Is Unconstitutional and Violates the RFRA
In addition to arguing that the Constitution does not require the ban, oppo-
nents of the ban directly attack its legality on free speech and free exercise
grounds, as well as under the RFRA.48 The most compelling free speech argu-
ment is that campaign activity is protected speech under the First Amendment,
and, accordingly, banning this activity as a condition of obtaining section
501(c)(3) status places an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of a consti-
tutional right.49 Opponents argue the availability of section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions is an inadequate remedy for these constitutional concerns because it is not
the most narrowly tailored solution to advance the government’s interest50
since it still prohibits political campaigning by section 501(c)(3) organizations
even if the activity is not being subsidized by tax-exempt dollars.51 Opponents
At least one commentator believes that the question of whether the exemption consti-
tutes a subsidy affects how one evaluates the arguments against the ban’s constitutionality.
See Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participa-
tion in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 544 (1999).
48 See, e.g., Buckles, Separation of Church and State, supra note 44; Leff, supra note 8;
Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax
Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politicians,
51 U. PITT. L. REV. 577 (1990); Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 7; Meghan J. Ryan,
Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations?, 40 IND. L. REV. 73 (2007); Smith, supra note
44; Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach to Section
501(c)(3)’s Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504 (1999).
Another constitutional challenge that has been raised—although it is not that convincing—is
that § 501(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 515–18; Allan J. Samansky, Tax Conse-
quences When Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 145,
158–59 (2007).
49 Leff, supra note 8, at 686–96; Chisolm, supra note 48, at 631–40; Jeffrey Mikell John-
son, Comment, The 501(c)(3) Campaign Prohibition as Applied to Churches: A Considera-
tion of the Prohibition’s Rationale, Constitutionality, and Possible Alternatives, 2 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 557, 559 (2008); Klapach, supra note 48, at 513–15; Samansky, supra note 48, at
158–60.
50 See Part II.A. for a discussion of the criticisms about the effectiveness of § 501(c)(4)
organizations in addressing the ban’s opponents’ substantive constitutional and policy
concerns.
51 Leff, supra note 8; see also Buckles, Separation of Church and State, supra note 44, at
469 (arguing that the ban is potentially an over-inclusive method of separating the state from
religious speech because: (1) it restricts the speech of both religious and non-sectarian enti-
ties equally; (2) it applies to religious and non-sectarian statements of political support
equally; and (3) it restricts religious speech not only publicly but privately as well). While
describing the ban’s over-inclusive nature, Buckles also notes the paradox of the ban being
under-inclusive in certain respects as well. Id. (arguing the ban is not effective in achieving
separation between church and state because: (1) it still permits religious leaders to make
political endorsements in their personal capacities; (2) other avenues of political speech,
such as section 501(c)(4) organizations, are still available; and (3) the ban permits a certain
degree of lobbying, while it restricts direct campaign activity completely).
Lending further support to the argument that the ban is perhaps not the most narrowly
tailored solution available to further the government’s interest is the legion of proposals that
suggest more narrowly tailored solutions. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 4, at
322–23 (proposing (1) to permit political campaign activity but to disallow section 170 char-
itable deductions to organizations that engage in such activity and (2) creating a new classifi-
cation for religious organizations in which they could elect to opt-in to a tax exempt status
that would permit internal political campaign speech and also proposing relevant changes to
other provisions of tax and election law to accommodate these proposals); Buckles, Not Even
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argue the free exercise of religion is violated because “[t]he loss of tax-exempt
status for engaging in speech or activities that churches feel are mandated by
a Peep, supra note 29 (providing a good summary of some of the more recent proposals and
suggesting that restrictions only need to be levied against charitable organizations that are
not “independently controlled,” such as private foundations, and that these restrictions can be
effectively implemented through an excise tax); Chisolm, supra note 48 (offering a variety
of suggestions such as: (1) allowing section 501(c)(3) organizations to solicit contributions
for their political action committees; (2) allowing federal election law to take care of any
concerns regarding section 501(c)(3) organizations obtaining political favors in exchange for
endorsements; (3) restricting the types of activities that should be prohibited); Anne Berrill
Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political
Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1992) (offering an approach simi-
lar to Chisholm’s); Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns
by Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008) [hereinafter Buckles, Tobin Reply] (proposing a number of alter-
natives, such as: (1) allowing limited political campaign activity with limitations either in the
form of percentage of activity test, a dollar threshold cap, or a counteracting excise tax; and
(2) disallowing a deduction for a portion of charitable deductions made to organizations that
engage in political campaign activity); Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church,
Political Activity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 372 (2007) (proposing a
rule that would allow small religious organizations the ability to receive taxable financing
that could be spent on political campaigns without having to form a separate organization);
Leff, supra note 8 (proposing that the IRS issue guidance stating that only expenditures
related to campaign intervention (as opposed to speech) are prohibited but also stating
explicitly that these expenditures could be made through “non-501(c)(3) affiliates”); Kem-
mitt, supra note 17 (rejecting the concept of allowing limited political campaign activity on
the grounds that such an exception would violate the Establishment Clause and proposing,
similar to Leff, a bright line rule that only campaign-related expenditures, rather than speech,
be prohibited); Totten, supra note 14, at 321 (proposing that section 501(c)(3) be amended
“to exclude from the meaning of political campaign intervention the content of any sermon,
homily, teaching, or other oral presentation made in the course of a regular church meet-
ing”); Deborah J. Zimmerman, Note, Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti: First Amendment
Considerations to Loss of Tax Exemption, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 249 (2003) (making a proposal
similar to Totten’s); Bruch, supra note 17, at 1281 (proposing “a system where only political
interventions aimed at the public would be investigated and subjected to penalties or revoca-
tion”); Blair, supra note 44, at 435–37 (proposing a limited exception for regularly sched-
uled religious services held by churches); Samansky, supra note 48, at 165 (proposing that
church leaders should have complete freedom of speech during church services or in news-
letters); Johnson, supra note 49 (supporting the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration
Act, which would establish that religious speech given in the context of something like a
sermon would not be considered political campaign activity). But see, e.g., Benjamin S. De
Leon, Rendering a Taxing New Tide on I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): The Constitutional Implications
of H.R. 2357 and Alternatives for Increased Political Freedom in Houses of Worship, 23
REV. LITIG. 691 (2004) (illustrating an example of a critique of this Act); Benjamin Vaughn,
Note, The High Cost of Free Exercise: All Saints, the Service, and Section 501(c)(3), 61 TAX
LAW 981 (2008) (proposing that any behavior that does not involve a “direct expenditure” of
funds be permitted); Klapach, supra note 48, at 541–42 (proposing that some political activ-
ity could be permissible as long as it is conducted in a neutral manner, whenever possible);
Ablin, supra note 47 (offering the alternative proposals of: (1) allowing some political dis-
cussion as long as no efforts were made to explicitly elect or defeat a particular candidate;
(2) allowing political participation as long as it does not constitute a “substantial part” of a
church’s activities; or (3) simply imposing a flat cap of 5% of revenue on amounts that a
church can spend on campaign activity); Feld, supra note 46 (arguing that the ban’s broad
scope could be restricted to avoid any constitutional entanglement issues); cf. Colinvaux,
supra note 17 (examining a variety of possible solutions and concluding that the status quo
truly is the best possible compromise).
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their religious beliefs effectively forces churches to change their behavior in
order to receive tax-exempt status.”52
Although a constitutional challenge based purely on a free exercise claim
might be difficult to establish in light of the rational basis standard of review
delineated in Smith,53 the constitutional argument becomes much stronger if it
is framed as a hybrid claim under Smith.54 A hybrid claim is one that implicates
free exercise concerns as well as another fundamental constitutional right, such
as free speech. Under such a claim, the courts will apply a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review.55 Combining the free exercise concerns with the free speech
concerns “creates both a colorable free speech claim and a colorable free exer-
cise claim under the First Amendment . . . making [the ban] a prime target for
ratcheting up the standard of scrutiny.”56 Thus, while free exercise or free
speech claims, standing by themselves, might be weak bases for constitutional
challenge, they become much stronger when taken together.
Opponents also argue the ban violates the RFRA. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer
argues the RFRA prohibits the ban from applying to political endorsements
made during sermons because political sermons are so interwoven with a relig-
ious organization’s other worship activities that banning them would substan-
tially burden religious exercise.57 The RFRA requires that, in light of this
52 Blair, supra note 44, at 426. The ban’s ability to infringe upon an organization’s religious
mission is what creates unique free exercise problems with the ban that are not present in
other conditions that must be satisfied to obtain and maintain tax exempt status. See Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional
Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1210–11 (2009) [hereinafter Mayer, Politics at the
Pulpit]; see also Vaughn, supra note 51.
53 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see Mayer, Politics at
the Pulpit, supra note 52, at 1143. Mayer argues, however, that the free exercise challenge
becomes stronger still if what he describes as the “church autonomy doctrine” is expanded
into:
[A] full-blown institutional view of free exercise that . . . [acknowledges] that under the Free
Exercise Clause, there are not only areas where government interests, such as prisons, the mili-
tary, use of public lands, and internal administration, should easily overcome free exercise of
religion concerns, but also areas where religious institution interests, such as intra-church dis-
putes, ministerial employment decisions, and internal religious communications, should easily
overcome government concerns.
Id. Of course, arguments that would be unsuccessful under Smith potentially could be suc-
cessful under the RFRA.
54 Ryan, supra note 48, at 86–95; Samansky, supra note 48.
55 Ryan, supra note 48, at 86; Samansky, supra note 48.
56 Ryan, supra note 48, at 89; Samansky, supra note 48. Note that, while believing that
strict enforcement of the ban could be unconstitutional under a Smith hybrid theory, Ryan
does not believe that the solution would be to remove the ban completely—she believes that
the constitutional problem can be solved by providing more deference to religious organiza-
tions as to when their messages are purely religious rather than political, within limits. Ryan,
supra note 48, at 94–95. Of course, such deference does not solve the constitutional problem
if the political message itself is deemed to be fundamentally religious, a possibility that Ryan
appears to discount. Id. at 95.
57 Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit, supra note 52, at 1142–43. Note, however, that not all
commentators who support more political involvement of religious organizations necessarily
believe that making a political endorsement in a sermon is an inherent part of the organiza-
tion’s religious mission. See James, supra note 51, at 410 (“[T]he pulpit, the sacred desk
entrusted to the preacher, should not be used for political campaigning by political candi-
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substantial burden, the government must “demonstrate that the prohibition is
the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling governmental interest, a
high standard of scrutiny that will be very difficult for the government to
meet.”58
According to Mayer, the traditional compelling interests that have been
advanced for the ban do not hold up as justifications because: (1) the threat to
the tax system is minimal because most donors do not deduct their contribu-
tions; (2) some private benefit is acceptable as long as it is no more than is
needed to accomplish charitable goals; (3) there is little evidence supporting the
risk of corruption as a serious concern; (4) religious organizations would not be
seen as speaking for the government because of the intervening choices by
donors and because of the diversity of religious organizations’ political views;
(5) the government has no interest in protecting a religious organization from
itself; and (6) the ban does not further separation of church and state because
religious organizations are not subject to the ban if they choose not to be tax
exempt and because the ban actually forces increased entanglement of church
and state because of the IRS’s obligation to monitor religious speech.59 Finally,
Mayer points out that even if some of the government’s interests are legitimate,
the ban is certainly not the least restrictive method of implementing those
interests.60
Chris Kemmitt has taken the RFRA argument even further by arguing the
ban violates the RFRA to the extent that it applies to any religious organiza-
tion’s activity that is conducted without tax-exempt financing.61 Kemmitt
argues the ban substantially burdens religious free exercise because “it imper-
missibly conditions the receipt of . . . tax-exempt status . . . upon the forfeiture
of free exercise of religion . . . [and because] it allows the government to
remove religious leaders’ control over what activities and beliefs constitute
religion.”62 Kemmitt, like Mayer, rejects the primary compelling government
interests that proponents advance and argues instead that the government’s only
dates. These activities should rightly be carried out within the political for-profit entities
established by the churches . . . .”).
58 Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit, supra note 52, at 1143 (also arguing that expanding the
“church autonomy doctrine” would strengthen the RFRA claim as well as the Free Exercise
Claim); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. The difficulty the government will
have in establishing a compelling government interest has historical roots, as Jennifer Smith
has pointed out. Smith, supra note 44 (arguing that the legislative history behind section
501(c)(3) indicates that the statute was never intended to provide a blanket prohibition of the
participation of tax exempt religious organizations in political life).
Of course, even if the ban does violate the RFRA, the RFRA’s protections would only
apply to the federal ban as opposed to any bans imposed by the states. Mayer, Politics at the
Pulpit, supra note 52, at 1161 n.121 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 & n.1 (2006) and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)) (pointing out that, “[e]ven if there is a constitutional question regarding RFRA’s
application to the federal government, it is unclear who would raise this issue as neither
plaintiffs seeking to invoke RFRA’s protection nor the federal government would be likely
to do so”).
59 Id. at 1184, 1188–92.
60 Id. at 1188, 1190–91.
61 Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 146.
62 Id. at 169.
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compelling interest is to prevent such tax-exempt financing from subsidizing
religious organizations’ political speech.63
Thus, while acknowledging that the government has a compelling interest
to restrict certain types of political activity from religious organizations, those
who attack it on RFRA grounds believe that the government is painting with
too broad of a brush in addressing this interest because the interest can be
defined much more narrowly, which in turns leads to a much more narrowly
tailored solution.
C. The Ban Is Bad Policy
The ban’s opponents also attack the ban on policy grounds. Opponents
argue the ban allows the government to exert undue influence over religious
organizations and that the ban “is simply the government’s way of paying
churches not to talk about certain things.”64 They argue this allows the govern-
ment to exercise virtual control over religious organizations by using the tax
code as a political weapon,65 and to serve as the ultimate arbiter of what
spheres are appropriate for religious organization participation.66 Exacerbating
63 Id. at 162–63.
64 Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42
B.C. L. REV. 771, 779 (2001) (discussing Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When
God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax-Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clin-
ton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 434 (2001)); Blair, supra note 44, at
426 (quoting Lee, supra); Buckles, Tobin Reply, supra note 51, at 1093–94 (“[I]f the ban
truly changes the behavior of churches, including the practice of taking political stands on
candidates in accordance with church dogma, the ban itself constitutes one of the most egre-
gious forms of governmental co-option of the religious community that one can envisage.”).
Note that this is the mirror image of the argument advanced by the ban’s supporters, who
claim that the ban is necessary to prevent religious organizations from having a dispropor-
tionate influence over the government. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
65 Eric R. Swibel, Comment, Churches and Campaign Intervention: Why the Tax Man is
Right and How Congress Can Improve His Reputation, 57 EMORY L.J. 1605 (2008)
(acknowledging claims of political bias that have been levied against IRS investigations into
religious organizations.); Kelly S. Shoop, Note, If You Are a Good Christian You Have No
Business Voting for This Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elec-
tions, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1927, 1944–45 (2005) (stating that although an audit revealed no
evidence of such bias, it of course could be possible that the auditing agency itself could be
biased); Klapach, supra note 48.
66 Garnett, supra note 64; Totten, supra note 14, at 307 (“The question of what hinders or
advances the mission of a church, synagogue, or mosque is not a question that the govern-
ment can or should answer. . . . [This is a question] solely for the church.”); see also Buck-
les, Separation of Church and State, supra note 44, at 472 (arguing that separation of church
and state “supports the position that churches, not government, should determine the propri-
ety of their speech.”). Garnett observes that the government’s ability to relegate religious
organizations to the sidelines by defining the boundaries of what is appropriate political
participation by such organizations is bad not only for religion, but also for society at large.
Garnett, supra note 64, at 800 (“A free and liberal society, and the goods for which it aims,
depend on a busy and crowded public square.”); see also James, supra note 51, at 402
(noting that the ban has a disproportionate chilling effect on participation by the African-
American community in political life because “more than in any other religious body, clergy
of the African-American Church still see their mission as influencing society through politi-
cal activity.”). Note that these arguments are similar to the arguments raised to demonstrate
“substantial burden” in claiming that the ban violates the RFRA. See, e.g., Kemmitt, supra
note 17, at 174 (“The campaign-activity prohibition also substantially burdens religion and
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this problem is the fact that, because of inconsistent IRS enforcement, religious
organizations often err on the side of caution in determining the appropriate
boundaries of their political speech.67 As a result, religious organizations run
the risk of losing their ability to serve as independent third-party institutions
that influence the dialogue between individuals and the state in shaping societal
values.68
The ban’s opponents also aggressively criticize the argument that the ban
is good public policy because it prevents the government from exerting undue
influence over religious organizations.69 These critics argue that the risk of
government interference is overblown in this situation because: (1) religious
organizations can still be pressured to endorse candidates through affiliates;70
(2) religious organizations might actually feel more pressure to change their
religious message in order to comply with the ban;71 and (3) religious organiza-
tions will often not wish to engage in political campaign activity, even if they
could, because they fear alienating their parishioners and donor base.72 Further-
more, even if religious organizations might be negatively impacted by engaging
in political campaign activity, it is not the place of government to impose its
view paternalistically on religious organizations.73
religious institutions by encroaching upon the ability of the church to define what is and
what is not religious.”). These arguments lend weight to the claim that political campaign
activity could fall under the “charitable” or “religious” mission of a religious organization
and thus must be permitted if religious organizations are to be able to fulfill their charitable
goals fully. See Carroll, supra note 50, at 252–53 (“Neither Congress nor the courts nor the
IRS has ever explained . . . why campaign-related speech or conduct so differs from . . .
other [permissible] attempts to influence the political, social, economic, or moral status quo
that an organization engaging in it cannot properly be called ‘charitable.’”) (footnote
omitted).
67 Totten, supra note 14, at 309 (“Although the past lack of enforcement means that some
religious leaders routinely flaunt the prohibition, in other cases the result of this uncertainty
is a chilling effect on otherwise legitimate speech.”) (footnote omitted); Ryan, supra note 48,
at 85 (“Research demonstrates that many §501(c)(3) organizations cower in fear of the IRS
and avoid any kind of advocacy, even that which might be permitted.”) (footnote omitted).
This uncertainty is, in part, due to the fact that it is often difficult to distinguish between
permissible issue advocacy and impermissible political campaign activity. Buckles, Not Even
a Peep, supra note 29. Although the IRS has attempted to provide clarity as to precisely
what is prohibited, it has been unsuccessful in combating this uncertainty. Ryan, supra note
48.
68 Garnett, supra note 64, at 799; Buckles, Not Even a Peep, supra note 29 (noting that the
ban prevents religious organizations from being effective in cooperating with the govern-
ment to meet community needs because it prevents religious organizations from having a say
in choosing their “partners” in government and because it prevent religious organizations
from being able to defend themselves against a hostile government); Ablin, supra note 47
(noting that the ban prevents critical voices from participating fully in politics).
69 This policy justification for the ban is discussed in Part I.B.
70 Buckles, Tobin Reply, supra note 51.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1087 (“One should resist the urge to use federal tax law to repress one form of
religious expression in order to promote a vision of healthy religion.”).
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D. The Alternative Mechanism of Section 501(c)(4) Organizations Is
Insufficient to Protect Religious Organizations’ Speech Rights
In addition to the legal and policy critiques, the ban’s opponents also
argue the ban does not already provide a sufficient mechanism for addressing
their legal and policy concerns through the use of section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions. They argue the very separation established by using section 501(c)(4)
organizations prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from being involved in political
campaign activity because such separation prevents these organizations from
using their pulpits to make such political statements.74 According to Chris
Kemmitt, this forced separation prevents section 501(c)(4) organizations from
serving as a suitable alternative to speech from the pulpit.75 Therefore, accord-
ing to Kemmitt, the use of section 501(c)(4) organizations cannot satisfy the
judicial doctrine set out in Regan v. Taxpayers with Representation76 and
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti77 that the ban does not substantially burden relig-
ion as long as there is an alternative mechanism for religious organizations to
express their political views.78
III. MOVING TOWARDS COMPROMISE: A PROPOSAL FOR A SELF-DIRECTED
TAX ON TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
While many of the proposals to resolve this debate center on carving out
limited exceptions to the ban, these proposals ignore the reality that there is not
the political will to allow churches to remain tax-free and engage in political
endorsements.79 Based on such logic, many think that the current system, a
zero-sum gain between tax exemption and political participation,80 is the best
we can do. However, a compromise that serves the values of both sides of this
debate is possible. If a tax that was required to allow increased political partici-
pation were imposed in such a way that its payment would be part of a religious
74 Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 173; Leff, supra note 8, at 701–02; Mayer, Politics at the
Pulpit, supra note 52, at 1173–75; Totten, supra note 14, at 314–16, 322; see also Buckles,
Tobin Reply, supra note 51, at 1124 (noting that requiring the use of § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions creates additional administrative costs in addition to preventing direct endorsements
from the pulpit). Buckles acknowledges, however, that the very separation that the ban’s
supporters desire might be illusory because, despite the separation in form, functionally
“[t]he general public is unlikely to assign enormous significance to the distinction between a
pastor’s endorsement on behalf of his church and his endorsement on behalf of himself or a
church affiliate.” Id. at 1105.
75 Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 172.
76 Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). For an explanation of
the doctrine, see Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 173. See also supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
77 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
78 Kemmitt, supra note 17, at 172.
79 Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors—Campaigning From the Pulpit is Okay: Thinking
Past the Symbolism of Section 501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 125,
126 (2006). “In fact, leaders of a broad spectrum of American congregations have opposed
efforts to relax the campaigning restriction in Section 501(c)(3).” Id. at 160 (footnote
omitted).
80 It is a zero-sum gain system because tax exempt organizations already have the choice to
engage in political campaign activity as long as they do not elect tax-exempt status.
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organization’s religious mission and would serve as the vehicle for increased
political participation, the tax would be an effective mechanism for balancing
competing interests because it would allow increased and unsubsidized political
participation by religious organizations while still providing these organizations
tax advantages not enjoyed by for-profit entities.
This part proposes that an elective “self-directed tax” could be made avail-
able to tax-exempt organizations, and the ban on political campaign activity
could be modified, or perhaps lifted completely, from those organizations that
elect the tax. This proposal is a compromise; therefore, it runs the risk of satis-
fying no one. Nevertheless, this proposal would effectively address the funda-
mental concerns of both sides by providing an incentive for religious
organizations to engage in traditionally tax-exempt activity81 while not signifi-
cantly distancing them from the political process.
A. The Basics of a Self-Directed Tax
A “self-directed tax” would be an elective tax that any organization that
currently qualifies as tax-exempt could choose instead of remaining tax-exempt
and complying with the current restrictions. The self-directed tax would ini-
tially be a tax like any other—an income tax levied against all of the potentially
taxable income of an organization that would currently be classified as tax-
exempt. What would make this tax unique is that the organizations electing the
tax would designate how the government spends the tax dollars these organiza-
tions contribute. Although these organizations would not have unfettered dis-
cretion to mandate that the government spend their tax dollars, they could
select which areas of existing government spending the government should
support with their tax dollars.82 A similar rule could be applied to those who
donate to the electing organizations. Rather than allowing a tax deduction for
the donation, under the self-directed tax the donor would be denied a deduction
for the donation but would be permitted to allocate the tax due on the donated
funds in a similar fashion.83
For organizations electing the self-directed tax, the ban on political speech
and campaign activity would no longer be necessary to satisfy subsidization
81 See James, supra note 51, at 404 (noting that “[u]nless the government is ready to pro-
vide services to ‘feed the souls’ of Americans, or to provide society with the services pro-
vided by the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations, it would be foolhardy for
Congress to abolish the charitable tax exemption”).
82 For example, one religious organization electing the tax might prioritize aid to the poor
and would direct that its tax dollars be spent for governmental programs that provide aid
such as food stamps, while another religious organization electing the tax might prioritize
providing adequate health care and would direct its tax dollars towards programs like Medi-
care and Medicaid.
An argument could certainly be made that the list of potential government spending
choices for self-directed tax dollars might have to be restricted to a list of potential areas in
which it is more likely that the charitable organizations would have superior knowledge to
the government regarding how spending should be allocated. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as
Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 427–28 (1998) (noting that “there are many contexts . . .
where we should not expect legislatures readily to give up their decisionmaking and
patronage potential”).
83 This would be true regardless of whether or not the donor itemizes deductions.
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concerns because the government could not be viewed as subsidizing such
speech. However, a relaxed ban might still be necessary to address some of the
non-subsidization policy arguments raised by the ban’s supporters. Accord-
ingly, rather than permitting overt political campaign activity, the organizations
subject to the tax could be permitted to promote to the public exactly how they
direct the government to spend their tax dollars.84 In addition, the organizations
could affirmatively identify political candidates who support similar prioritiza-
tion of government spending. Such disclosure would provide a clearer connec-
tion between the organization and political candidates that the organization
would support,85 while falling short of permitting direct campaign activity.
This carrot of increased political involvement is why the tax would have to
be elective. Simply replacing tax-exempt organizations’ current tax benefits
with the self-directed tax would not be viable because not all organizations
have an equally strong desire to engage in political activity. Those organiza-
tions that have no political aspirations would balk at having a current benefit
lessened to receive another benefit they do not value. Even religious organiza-
tions that only occasionally wish to violate the ban might find the self-directed
tax unappealing because the penalties against such churches could be compara-
tively light.86 Furthermore, for the election to provide any meaningful choice to
tax-exempt organizations that desire to be heavily involved in the political
process, efforts to enforce the ban against organizations that do not choose the
self-directed tax, but that nonetheless attempted to increase their political
involvement, would have to be increased significantly over their currently ane-
mic levels (and potential penalties might have to be increased as well).87 With-
84 They would be permitted to do this directly without having to form a separate entity.
Thus, for example, a religious organization promoting how it allocated its tax dollars in a
sermon would be acceptable.
85 This connection would be arguably clearer than the simple issue advocacy that is cur-
rently permitted because it is tied into government spending that already exists, thus making
it easier for political candidates and religious organizations to align themselves closely in
areas of broader consensus of the electorate without having to focus on particular issues that
might be more polarizing (and therefore less likely to produce public statements from politi-
cal candidates).
86 Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 7, at 36–38 (noting, as did the court in Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that revocation of tax exempt
status is potentially a minor penalty against churches because such status would be automati-
cally restored the day after the noncompliant activity ceased, and that, because of difficulties
in allocating expenditures to noncompliant activity, the other financial penalties available
under section 4955 might not be that severe); see also Bruch, supra note 17, at 1275–76.
One would hope, however, that religious organizations, given a choice between a regime that
would allow them to engage in political activity without breaking the law, and one that
would require them to break the law but pay a penalty, would welcome being able to conduct
even occasional political activities without having to violate the civil law openly.
87 See Kara Backus, Note, All Saints Church and the Argument for a Goal-Driven Applica-
tion of Internal Revenue Service Rules for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 301, 303, 335 (2008) (making suggestions for improved IRS enforcement of the ban);
Bruch, supra note 17, at 1273–79 (detailing recent IRS enforcement efforts and docu-
menting some of the difficulties the IRS has had in enforcing the ban); Siri Mielke Buller,
Note, Lobbying and Political Restrictions on § 501(c)(3) Organizations: A Guide for Com-
pliance in the Wake of Increased IRS Examination, 52 S.D. L. REV. 136, 154–55 (2007)
(summarizing the results of the IRS’s Political Activities Compliance Initiative for the 2004
election season); Dolak, supra note 7; Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 7, at 4–8, 38–39
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out such an increase, there would be no incentive for any organization to elect
the self-directed tax.
B. How the Self-Directed Tax Provides an Effective Compromise to the
Debate Over the Current Ban
The self-directed tax is a superior mechanism for protecting religious
organizations’88 desires to participate in the political process, while safeguard-
ing the public’s desire not to subsidize religious political endorsements beyond
the current mechanism under section 501(c)(4). Unlike the current system, the
self-directed tax directly injects the religious organizations into the political
process by permitting these organizations to lend their voice to the political
debate without having to dilute their message through another entity.89 The
self-directed tax accomplishes this without the government losing any revenue
by putting significant safeguards in place to ensure that a religious organization
is not forced to fund anything inconsistent with its religious mission.90
In addition to addressing the subsidization concerns surrounding the ban,
the self-directed tax adequately remedies the non-subsidization concerns as
well.91 The presence of a mild ban, such as the one contemplated by the self-
directed tax, would help preserve the existing deterrent against religious organi-
zations attempting to gain too much influence over government by taking
advantage of political candidates’ desires to use them as a source of tax-deduct-
ible political contributions.92 Furthermore, such a mild ban would protect the
religious organizations from possible coercive government influence because
there would be less of an incentive for political candidates to promise  political
favoritism to those organizations that directly compromised their teachings in
their public communications.93 The self-directed tax would also not raise a hor-
izontal equity problem because all direct political contributions would be taxed
the same way and political candidates would not receive a tax advantage from
(acknowledging that eventually the penalty regime might have to be altered in order to deter
organizations that engage in minor, but more widespread, violations of the ban); Shoop,
supra note 65, at 1948–49 (arguing for increased enforcement of the ban); Jason M. Sneed,
Note, Regaining Their Political Voices: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Promise
of Delivering Churches from the Section 501(c)(3) Restrictions on Lobbying and Campaign-
ing, 13 J. L. & POL. 493, 508–09 (1997).
88 Although such a tax would need to be applied to all tax-exempt organizations (as opposed
to religious organizations) in order to avoid constitutional concerns, the remaining analysis
of the benefits and problems of such a tax will focus on religious organizations because they
have taken center stage in the current debate over the ban. But see Samansky, supra note 48
(observing that certain preferential treatment of religious organizations can occur without
violating the Establishment Clause).
89 Of course, there is still some inevitable dilution of the message if the organization is still
prohibited from directly endorsing a candidate, but can only do so directly through a discus-
sion of spending priorities.
90 The possibility of completely mitigating against the risk of a religious organization poten-
tially having to fund something it disagrees with is unlikely because, given the diversity in
religious belief, it is impossible to rule out the potential of a religion rejecting all forms of
government spending inconsistent with its religious mission.
91 See supra Part I.
92 See supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text.
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receiving one source over another.94 Finally, rather than fostering anti-demo-
cratic concerns, the self-directed tax would ameliorate them95 because it treats
all donors equally, it does not result in any revenue loss from the government,
and the relief being granted allows taxpayers to express their preferences
between a range of goals that have already been subjected to the democratic
process.96
The self-directed tax also addresses the concerns over the government
preventing religious organizations from interacting in the political arena.
Although the self-directed tax would prohibit religious organizations from
engaging in direct campaign endorsements, it provides a mechanism for relig-
ious organizations to participate in the political arena by allowing them to allo-
cate their tax dollars, to promote those allocations publicly, and to indicate
which political candidates have been strong supporters of similar government
spending priorities. In addition, the self-directed tax provides greater flexibility
to religious organizations to determine for themselves the appropriate level of
their political activity.
Some might initially be concerned about the financial damage caused by
the imposition of the self-directed tax. First, the financial burden might be too
much for religious organizations to bear. This concern might be overstated97
because, even if religious organizations were subjected to taxation, donations to
religious organizations are not taxable as tax-free gifts under section 102.98
Furthermore, should section 102 fail to protect the donations from taxation,99
there would be little tax owed because most churches operate near the break-
even point.100
Second, the self-directed tax might lead to a drop in charitable giving
because donors would no longer be permitted to deduct their donations
(although donors would still receive a benefit by being able to allocate the tax
dollars attributable to the donations).101 Currently there is little evidence on this
94 See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
96 Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047,
1080–82 (arguing that charitable contributions can only further democratic principles if they
satisfy the following three conditions: (1) charitable deductions should not be given more
preferential treatment as the donor’s income increases, in order to prevent certain groups
from having outsized influence; (2) total revenue loss from charitable relief should be lim-
ited to preserve the government’s allocation of how the burden should be distributed; and (3)
charitable relief should be limited to those contributions that further broad, publicly defined
goals).
97 Hatfield, supra note 79, at 141–45; see also Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for
For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2025–26 (2007); Totten, supra note 14, at
313–14. But see James, supra note 51, at 404 (arguing that the tax exempt status of religious
organizations is enormously beneficial to those organizations).
98 Hatfield, supra note 79, at 155; Totten, supra note 14, at 313.
99 This is certainly at least a plausible concern because the tax-free gift argument assumes
that such gifts would meet the necessary “detached and disinterested generosity” standard of
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960), which may not be a completely safe
assumption. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that
gifts made to religious ministers were taxable because they did not satisfy this standard).
100 Hatfield, supra note 79, at 157; see also Malani & Posner, supra note 97, at 2025.
101 Blair, supra note 44, at 426–27; Totten, supra note 14, at 313–14; see also Hatfield,
supra note 79, at 128, 159.
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point, which has led to inconsistent conclusions. Accordingly, commentators
can only speculate.102 On one hand, taxpayers might respond to the loss of the
economic incentive—the tax deduction—by donating less. On the other hand,
donations to religious organizations are often driven by religious, and not just
economic, motivations.103 Whether the economic or the religious motivation
predominates remains an open question.104
Removing the different tax treatment of charitable contributions for
itemizers and non-itemizers in the context of the self-directed tax could amelio-
rate the potential decline in giving. Charitable donations are currently itemized
deductions (and thus not available to all taxpayers),105 and it is unclear if the
primary donors to religious organizations are predominantly itemizers (only
around 30 percent of taxpayers) or non-itemizers.106 If current donors are pri-
marily itemizers, removing the donors’ contribution deductions to entities elect-
ing the self-directed tax, but allowing both itemizers and non-itemizers to
allocate the tax dollars attributable to their donated funds, could help ameliorate
any negative financial impact. Nevertheless, because donations from individu-
als constitute nearly all of religious organizations’ revenue, the uncertain effect
on donations could make religious organizations wary of embracing any propo-
sal that would remove this deduction.107
The self-directed tax, as an extension of the religious organizations’ mis-
sion, could help lessen this concern about the loss of the charitable deduction.
If the potential financial impact of taxing religious organizations is not as sig-
nificant as previously thought, any loss in revenue to religious organizations
would be outweighed by their increased ability to send a direct message about
which of the government’s priorities they consider the most consistent with
their charitable and religious goals. Rather than restricting the efficacy of relig-
ious organizations by limiting their resources, the ability to send this message
would provide religious organizations with more ways to fulfill their
mission.108
102 Blair, supra note 44, at 426–27; Totten, supra note 14, at 313–14; see also Aprill, supra
note 47, at 859; Hatfield, supra note 79, at 128, 159.
103 Blair, supra note 44, at 427.
104 Id. (noting that “[c]ongregants may assert they are contributing because of their religious
convictions, but until those congregants are faced with the loss of the deductibility of their
donations, and potentially higher tax liabilities, there is no way to know what they will do”).
105 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a), 63(d), 170 (2006).
106 See Aprill, supra note 47; Blair, supra note 44; Hatfield, supra note 79 (citing studies
that were based on admittedly limited data but tentatively indicated that the bulk of charita-
ble donations to religious organizations came from non-itemizers).
107 Blair, supra note 44, at 427 (arguing that religious organizations most likely fear even a
small decline in individual donations because it might force them to reduce their charitable
services); Aprill, supra note 47, at 844–45 (citing a study by Independent Sector, indicating
that individual donations account for approximately 94 percent of religious organizations
revenue); Totten, supra note 14, at 314 (“[T]he impact of losing the ability to receive tax-
deductible donations is real, since more than 94% of the revenue for religious congregations
comes from individuals. Absent a defensible rationale for this broad prohibition, faith com-
munities rightly hesitate to lose the charitable deduction.”) (footnote omitted).
108 Indeed, if one views the charitable tax deduction as a mechanism through which the
government allows citizens to dictate federal spending allocations, the structure of the self-
directed tax would be consistent with this view. See Levmore, supra note 82, at 405–06
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If further research establishes that imposing a tax on religious organiza-
tions has a devastating effect on their revenue streams,109 then religious organi-
zations are unlikely to accept such a tax. If, however, the financial impact of a
tax is relatively minimal, the self-directed tax would allow religious organiza-
tions to be more directly involved in political campaign activity without having
to suffer a significant negative financial impact.
IV. BEYOND COMPROMISE: ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF
A SELF-DIRECTED TAX
The fact that the self-directed tax serves as an effective compromise
between the two sides in the debate over the ban is enough to justify its imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, there are some secondary benefits that could poten-
tially be achieved from the self-directed tax. Specifically, the self-directed tax
could have the additional benefits of helping to create a norm-shift in tax com-
pliance and of achieving efficiency benefits from allowing section 501(c)(3)
organizations to generate and distribute profits.
A. A Self-Directed Tax Can Help Foster a Culture of Treating Tax
Compliance as a Moral Issue
By fully involving religious organizations in the tax system and giving
them a say in how their tax dollars are spent, the self-directed tax enables these
organizations to examine which areas of government spending they feel are
worthwhile. Such involvement could contribute to the idea that taxation is a
moral issue because, at its core, it represents society’s decision regarding which
public values will receive the most support.110 This recognition is important,
(describing the arguments for and against viewing the charitable tax deduction “as a social
choice mechanism to determine government spending”).
109 See Hatfield, supra note 79, at 159 (admitting that more empirical research needs to be
done in order to know for sure whether his suspicion is correct).
110 See, e.g., MARTIN T. CROWE, THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF PAYING JUST TAXES (1944)
(arguing that there is a moral obligation to pay just taxes and analyzing the Catholic theolog-
ical basis of that position); ROBERT W. MCGEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC
FINANCE (2004) (summarizing the discussion of taxation in multiple religious traditions);
Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics,
25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 679 (2006) (arguing that “Judeo-Christian ethics require tax policy
structures that both raise adequate revenues providing all citizens a reasonable opportunity to
reach their potential, and allocate the burden for paying the taxes under a moderately pro-
gressive model”) (footnote omitted); Susan Pace Hamill, A Moral Perspective on “Big Busi-
ness’” Fair Share of America’s Tax Burden, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 857, 861 (2004)
(arguing against traditional economic model of evaluating tax policy and expressing a prefer-
ence for the more moral-based systems of evaluating tax policy); Michael A. Livingston, The
Preferential Option, Solidarity, and the Virtue of Paying Taxes: Reflections on the Catholic
Vision of a Just Tax System (Jan. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958806 (arguing that Catholic principles of
solidarity and the preferential option for the poor have laid the moral foundation for Catholic
scholars to support a progressive tax system that justly allocates the tax burden while
rejecting the extremes of both Marxism and capitalism); Kenneth H. Ryesky, A Jewish Ethi-
cal Perspective to American Taxation, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2009); CATECHISM
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2409 (2d ed. 1997) (listing tax evasion as one of the ways an
individual can violate the Seventh Commandment’s prohibition on theft); see also id. at ¶
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not merely in the abstract, because if religious organizations appreciate the
moral component of taxation, they can start to discuss compliance with tax
laws in a moral context. Such a discussion could result in a significant norm-
shift that could increase tax compliance, and, accordingly, increase revenues.111
One of the more recent significant statements from a religious figure
regarding taxation comes from Pope Benedict XVI and lends support to the
theory that the self-directed tax could help further the moral dialogue regarding
taxation.112 In his most recent encyclical, Caritas in Veritate, the Pope refer-
ences a tax policy idea that he describes as “fiscal subsidiarity,”113 stating:
One possible approach to development aid would be to apply effectively what is
known as fiscal subsidiarity, allowing citizens to decide how to allocate a portion of
the taxes they pay to the State. Provided it does not degenerate into the promotion of
special interests, this can help to stimulate forms of welfare solidarity from below,
with obvious benefits in the area of solidarity for development as well.114
In laying out this general framework for a tax policy to assist in develop-
ment aid, the Pope suggests that involving citizens more directly in tax alloca-
tion could result in a more efficient and a more moral method of development.
Although the Pope restricted his discussion of this potential tax policy to its
benefits for developing states, there is no reason why such a policy could not
provide similar benefits for more developed societies.
The self-directed tax is a perfect example of the concept of fiscal sub-
sidiarity. The self-directed tax allows the potential solidarity benefits to occur
and provides a safeguard against potential special interest capture through the
relaxed ban. Although the solidarity benefits might not all occur, it is enough to
show that the Pope believes they might occur, showing an example of at least
2240 (establishing that paying taxes is morally obligatory as part of a taxpayer’s obligation
to submit to lawful authority).
111 See W. Edward Afield, Dining with Tax Collectors: Reducing the Tax Gap Through
Church-Government Partnerships, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 53 (2010).
112 Admittedly, the Catholic Church is not necessarily representative of all of Christianity,
much less non-Christian religions. Nevertheless, because the Pope has recently written
directly on this issue, the Catholic Church serves as a good potential test case regarding
whether the self-directed tax could get religious organizations more invested in viewing and
discussing the tax system as a moral issue.
113 BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE 125 (2009), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veri-
tate_en.html. The Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity states:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time
a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what
lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to
furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.
The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle mat-
ters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly.
Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to
it alone.
PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1938), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius
_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html (quoted in
Coverdale, supra note 45, at 902 (providing a good overview of the doctrine of
subsidiarity)).
114 Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 113, at 125.
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one major religion that could be receptive to the self-directed tax and that could
accordingly find itself more invested in the moral nature of the tax system.115
This could help produce the norm-shift necessary to achieve greater
compliance.
B. The Self-Directed Tax Could Advance Efficiency If, As a Component of
the Tax, Tax-Exempt Organizations Were Permitted to Generate and
Distribute Profits
To make the self-directed tax more palatable to both sides of the debate,
one of the features that could be added, although not necessary to achieve the
primary benefits, is to permit organizations subject to the tax to generate and
distribute profits to shareholders.116 The ban’s supporters might favor such a
requirement because the for-profit form could incentivize organizations to gen-
erate more profits that could accordingly be subject to the self-directed tax. If
the self-directed tax imposed on entities operating in the for-profit form were
appealing to enough religious organizations, then fewer such organizations
would be operating without paying any income taxes. In turn, the government’s
financial subsidization of religious political speech would decrease because the
number of religious organizations receiving a subsidy from the government
would be reduced, thus lowering the risk that subsidized organizations might
engage in political campaign activity.117 The ban’s opponents might favor such
115 But see Coverdale, supra note 45, at 894 (arguing that keeping tax-exempt organizations
outside the tax base is necessary in order to be consistent with Catholic social teaching).
Coverdale’s view suggests that applying fiscal subsidiarity to tax-exempt religious organiza-
tions would be inconsistent with Catholic social teaching because bringing these organiza-
tions into the tax base would potentially disincentivize gratuitous giving and would
potentially result in further, rather than decreased, centralization. See id. The self-directed
tax still offers considerable support for both of these foundational principles, however, which
potentially justifies its use if it allows for religious organizations to be more directly
involved in the political process. Although the self-directed tax removes an economic incen-
tive for charitable giving, it still leaves an incentive in place in the form of allowing contri-
butions to be eligible for self-allocation by the donor. Rather than decreasing truly charitable
giving, the self-directed tax increases it. With the self-directed tax, the donors no longer have
an economic motivation to give to charity (which by definition would decrease the gratui-
tousness of such a gift). They still have an incentive, but it is an incentive that allows them to
become more directly involved in the political process and to more closely link their gift to
the work of the charitable organization that the donor chooses to support, in that the donor
can direct its tax allocation in the same manner as that which the charity feels best furthers
its charitable purpose. Furthermore, while admittedly providing potentially more revenue to
a centralized government, the self-directed tax increases subsidiarity because it transfers the
decision-making process regarding how a portion of tax dollars are spent from the federal
government to individual tax-exempt organizations and donors. In addition, by involving
tax-exempt organizations more directly in the political process, the self-directed tax
increases subsidiarity by preventing an abdication of influence from these organizations in
the affairs of the state.
116 Currently, tax-exempt organizations organized for charitable purposes are not permitted
to operate as for-profit entities. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
117 Although the ban’s supporters tend to be most concerned with avoiding subsidizing the
involvement of religion in the political process, lessening the number of tax-exempt religious
organizations generally could be an appealing goal to them because fewer tax-exempt relig-
ious organizations necessarily means that the government is providing a smaller potential
subsidy towards religion generally. For those supporters of the ban more concerned with
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a requirement because the for-profit model could allow them to benefit from
certain efficiencies that are more prevalent in the for-profit sector.
Anup Malani and Eric Posner have recently described some of these
potential efficiencies that could make the for-profit form attractive to both the
organizations and to society.118 They argue that limiting the tax preferences to
non-profit charitable organizations forgoes efficiency that could be achieved by
improved management and administrative cost-cutting techniques present in
for-profit organizations’ inherent desire to increase profits.119 In addition, pro-
viding tax preferences to for-profit entities engaged in charitable activities
might encourage firms to produce more goods and services that have a public
benefit, as evidenced by the increasing growth and popularity of socially
responsible investment funds.120
Malani and Posner also offer a proposal that has some similar characteris-
tics to the self-directed tax, and they illustrate how the self-directed tax could
directly increase efficiency. They state:
An objection based on the public goods theory might be that the government
does not know which public goods the public values. Therefore, it must delegate
expenditures to donors because donations give signals about the public’s need. But
the idea that donors have private information about what the public needs is in some
tension with the idea that they are insensitive to administrative costs. Do donors care
or do they not? Even if one were to accept this tension, there is a reform that is both
better and simpler than the coupling of the nondistribution constraint with tax bene-
fits. That reform would ask people to select, say, on their income tax form, an activ-
avoiding entanglement between the government and religion, this benefit would not be as
substantial because, under the self-directed tax, although the government may not be subsi-
dizing religion, it is still entangled with it on account of the ability of the religious organiza-
tions to direct government spending under the self-directed tax.
118 Malani & Posner, supra note 97; see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corpo-
rate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (presenting
data demonstrating the efficiency benefits of using for-profit entities to achieve altruistic
ends).
119 Malani & Posner, supra note 97, at 2055. However, these efficiency gains could come at
a price in that the very thing that motivates many people to engage in charitable work (i.e.,
the increases in reputation and self-esteem that come from working for a non-profit organi-
zation) could be taken away. Brian Galle, Keeping Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1213 (2010) (positing for-profit could reduce the “warm glow” effect essential to recruiting
charitable employees, because these employees would have their “glow” reduced because
people might perceive them as simply working for a money-making enterprise). In addition,
charities might become less entrepreneurial as they become more motivated by protecting
profit bases. Id. at 1230. Accordingly, they might have to be subject to additional regulations
similar to those imposed on the current private sector in order to protect their customers from
abusive business practices. Id. at 1232; see also James R. Hines, Jr., et al., The Attack on
Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010) (challenging the
purported efficiency benefits of for-profit charities); Rob Atkinson, Keeping Republics
Republican, TEXAS L. REV. See Also 235 (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/
vol/88/responses/atkinson (arguing that the government is actually superior to both for-profit
and non-profit charitable organizations for securing the public good). Given the broad range
of charitable organizations, however, surely that sector comprises a big enough tent to allow
entrepreneurial charities to attract “warm glow” seekers, while more profit centered charities
could still produce the potential efficiency advantages that could be well worth any increased
regulation. Galle, supra note 119.
120 Malani & Posner, supra note 97, at 2022.
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ity—rather than the organization—they would like to fund and a dollar amount they
would like to fund that activity. Then the government would accumulate these dollars
and choose an organization to receive such dollars. (Individuals would remain free to
donate directly to an organization, but they would only receive a tax deduction for
donations to activities, not to organizations.) This procedure would elicit private
information about values of public goods, without coupling them to ill-chosen
organizations.121
Malani and Posner’s proposed efficiencies from using the government as
an intermediary between donors and the activities that they support are based
primarily on the fact such a system would allow the government to have better
knowledge regarding what the public values.
These efficiencies would be even more pronounced with the self-directed
tax. With the self-directed tax, the public preferences will have already been
reflected through the democratic process that produces the array of government
spending possibilities. The self-directed tax simply makes up any fund misallo-
cations in government spending by allowing society to commit funds directly to
areas where they believe the government has not directed sufficient funds.
Admittedly, the self-directed tax would provide less flexibility than Malani and
Posner’s proposal, which would allow taxpayers to select an activity regardless
of whether the government is currently spending money on it. However, unlike
Malani and Posner’s proposal, the self-directed tax does not weaken the con-
nection between the donor and the organization because it does not remove the
incentive for the donor to contribute directly to the organization. This strength-
ened connection is critical if the potential norm-shifting benefits in compliance
behavior are to be realized.122
The most significant disadvantage of a for-profit system is that the govern-
ment would have to narrow the scope of what it considers to be charitable
activities, because the broad definition under the current system would make it
difficult to distinguish charitable for-profit organizations from entities that are
engaged in activities solely with the purpose of increasing profits.123 This
restrictive definition of charitable activities would discourage experimental
charities that might provide value but might necessarily fall outside of the
restrictive definition.124
However, the need to impose a more restrictive definition of charity is
lessened in the context of the self-directed tax. If tax preferences come in the
form of tax exemptions and charitable deductions, there is certainly a need for a
more restrictive definition of charitable activities to mitigate the temptations
that for-profit entities not engaged in legitimate charitable activity might expe-
rience. Conversely, in the context of the self-directed tax, those concerns are
121 Id. at 2052.
122 See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
123 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 254 (pointing out, as an example,
that “any research and development efforts of for-profit firms might qualify as ‘scientific’”);
see also Galle, supra note 119, at 1215 (noting for-profit charities could create problems in
that they would increase the costs of monitoring charities because they would change how
those costs are distributed and would require greater costs in determining whether the partic-
ular activities are charitable).
124 Schizer, supra note 121, at 255.
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not as pronounced because the tax preference does not actually increase profits.
The tax, after all, is still imposed, and the preference simply takes the form of
who has authority to allocate the tax dollars.
CONCLUSION
The amount of energy spent debating the merits of a provision that is
rarely enforced, and would not significantly impact many organizations even if
it were enforced, is impressive. It is tempting to chalk this debate up to an
interesting discussion among academics with little real world importance. The
uncertainty surrounding the ban, however, could have a significant chilling
effect on speech by charitable organizations, making achieving a workable
solution essential to an appropriate integration of these organizations into
American   society.125 If religious organizations are feeling this chilling effect,
there is a significant policy conflict in play between the desire to include these
organizations more fully in the political process and the desire to avoid giving
religious organizations a preference in the political process that could run afoul
of principles of church and state separation.
Of course, one approach is to wait until one side of the debate clearly
triumphs over the other, once and for all. Another approach, often overlooked,
is to craft a proposal that addresses the primary concerns of both sides of the
debate. Existing proposals have failed in this regard because they have focused
primarily on what the contours of the ban should be from the perspective of
banning as much or as little as is constitutionally permissible or required. Often
the debate ends up being the constitutionality of regulating, or giving a prefer-
ence to, religion.126
The self-directed tax proposed in this Article is an initial attempt to find
this middle ground. Implementation of the self-directed tax allows religious
organizations (indeed, all charitable organizations) to be more involved in the
political process without receiving a government subsidy. At the same time,
because the self-directed tax prevents the government from taking a religious
organization’s profits and spending them on whatever the government wishes,
the proposal lessens some of the concerns that arise when one considers taxing
religious organizations. In fact, the self-directed tax has the added benefit of
allowing religious organizations to incorporate the tax system into their relig-
ious mission and their political advocacy. Thus, the tax has the effect of involv-
ing religious organizations more fully in the political process without any of the
concerns of providing financial benefits to religious political speech. Admit-
tedly, the self-directed tax is just one possible compromise—there are most
certainly other alternatives. If academics and policymakers are willing to con-
sider such compromise proposals, perhaps the opposing sides to this debate can
begin speaking with, instead of at, each other. That alone would be a step in the
right direction.
125 Totten, supra note 14, at 302–03.
126 See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 48 (the proposal offered by Samansky); Tobin, supra
note 11 (offering a corresponding critique to Samansky’s proposal).
